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1 Introduction 
In many economic interactions between a principal and an agent, contractual obligations 
can only be specified imprecisely, and hence it is difficult for third parties to guarantee 
contract enforcement. As a consequence, with selfish decision makers only minimal levels 
of contract fulfillment can be achieved, and potential gains from trade are forgone. In his 
seminal paper on incomplete contracts in labor markets, Akerlof (1982) analyzes such 
situations. He describes labor contracts as partial gift exchange and lays the foundation of 
the fair wage-effort hypothesis: agents’ efforts depend not only on the monetary wage but 
also on the perceived fairness of the wage, and as a consequence, it may be optimal for 
principals to pay more than the market-clearing wage (see also Gintis, 1976; Akerlof and 
Yellen, 1988, 1990). Empirically, the resulting positive wage-effort relationship and 
concomitant involuntary unemployment have been observed both in the laboratory (e.g., 
Fehr et al., 1993, 1997, 1998a,b; Fehr and Falk, 1999; Charness, 2000, 2004; Hannan et al., 
2002; Brown et al., 2004) and in the field (e.g., Gneezy and List, 2006; Bellemare and 
Shearer, 2009; Henning-Schmidt et al., 2010; Kube et al., 2012).1 
The existing literature has largely disregarded that Akerlof’s (1982) gift exchange 
hypothesis actually consists of two main aspects: Workers not only reciprocate to above 
market-clearing wages by providing higher effort levels (the well-known fair wage-effort 
hypothesis), but they also “acquire sentiment for each other” (p. 543). “As a consequence 
of worker sentiment for one another, the firm cannot deal with each worker individually, 
but rather must at least to some extent treat the group of workers with the same norm, 
collectively” (p. 544). 
This paper provides an experimental test of this neglected, second aspect of gift 
exchange that we call the fair uniform-wage hypothesis. To the best of our knowledge, we 
are the first to perform such a direct empirical test of Akerlof’s (1982) conjecture regarding 
mutual sentiments. The fair uniform-wage hypothesis stipulates that homogenous agents 
that are employed for the same wage level will exert more effort, resulting in higher rents, 
than agents that receive different wages. In order to test this hypothesis we extend the usual 
experimental setting that is based on a one-on-one matching of principals and agents to a 
multiple agents design. 
                                                 
1 Excellent recent overviews are provided by Charness and Kuhn (2010) and Cooper and Kagel 
(forthcoming), with the latter embedding gift exchange games in the broader context of studies on other-
regarding preferences. 
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In our experiment, principals interact with agents on a continuous posted offer 
market. Principals have identical profit functions, and agents do not differ with respect to 
their cost-of-effort function and productivity. In each period principals can offer a wage 
level privately to any of the agents or, alternatively, publicly to all agents on the market (a 
feature pioneered by Brown et al., 2004, and Kirchsteiger et al., 2005). Agents can accept 
any offer, but are restricted to a single contract in a given period. Principals are allowed to 
employ a maximum of three agents in each period, and labor demand is the short side of 
the market. After principals and agents have been matched through the market, agents have 
to choose an effort level. The higher the effort level, the higher is the cost for the agent, but 
so is also the principal’s profit.2 
We introduce two straightforward experimental treatments to this modified principal-
agent game that allow for an exogenous variation of the wage distribution within the firm 
and, hence, for a direct test of the fair uniform-wage hypothesis: (i) an individual contract 
treatment, henceforth abbreviated by IC, in which principals can, but need not, employ 
workers for identical contracts in a given period, and (ii) a uniform contract treatment, 
henceforth UC, in which principals are forced to employ all agents under the same 
conditions in a given period. More specifically, in the UC treatment, the first accepted 
contract simply serves as a blueprint for all other contracts that a principal can offer in a 
given period. In other words, she3 is bound to offer the same contract to all agents in the 
firm. This can be interpreted as an exogenous non-discriminatory clause, whose effects can 
be studied in treatment UC. All other features of the markets are kept identical across 
treatments. 
Our empirical results indicate that principals almost never offer identical contracts to 
a priori identical agents if they are allowed to differentiate individually (in IC), and that 
the number of uniform contracts within firms does not increase with increasing experience 
of principals. The introduction of uniform (standardized) contracts on the firm level has a 
significant and economically relevant effect on market parameters in UC: It increases 
average wages, effort levels, and market efficiency. We empirically corroborate the fair 
uniform-wage hypothesis. However, the efficiency premium of uniform wages is not a 
consequence of agents becoming more reciprocal in their effort choice in response to a 
given (uniform) wage level. Rather, the efficiency-enhancing effect is the consequence of 
                                                 
2 Of course, the wage can also be interpreted as a price and the effort as a quality level on an incomplete 
product market. 
3 We posit throughout the paper that the principals are female and the agents are male. 
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eliminating a tendency of principals to over-differentiate contracts within their firm – if 
they are allowed to – compared to the ex-post optimum. Making differentiation impossible 
leads to higher average wages, an increase in average effort levels and thus higher market 
efficiency. 
These results imply that Akerlof’s (1982) emphasis on adding a social component to 
his description of gift exchange seems crucial when it comes to efficiency. The total 
efficiency rent from gift exchange is the combination of the individual fair wage-effort 
relationship between a single principle and a single agent plus the fair uniform-wage 
relationship in a multiple-agents framework. In other words, limitations to contractual 
freedom – here, a non-discriminatory wage legislation targeted on the firm level – can have 
efficiency-enhancing effects and can thus be welfare-improving. 
Although there are several papers that study aspects or components of the contract 
offer made by a principal to an agent aside from the individual wage (e.g., Irlenbusch and 
Sliwka, 2005, who let the principal decide whether to use a piece rate; Falk and Kosfeld, 
2006, who implement forcible restrictions on the agent’s choice set; Fehr et al., 2007, who 
use non-enforceable promises by the principal), a real test of the fair uniform-wage 
hypothesis has to implement a multi-worker firm, i.e. a principal that can employ several 
agents. There is only a handful of existing experiments which extend the usual one-on-one 
setting that is either implemented bilaterally (e.g., Fehr et al., 1998b) or through a labor 
market (e.g., Brown et al., 2004) to a one-to-many setup. We are not aware of any direct 
test of the fair uniform-wage hypothesis, so far, because recent papers in this literature 
focus on social comparison in itself.4 
Cabrales and Charness (2011) study contracts offered simultaneously by one 
principal to two differently productive agents in a hidden information context. Contracts 
have to be accepted by both agents, reflecting a situation where contracts must be 
negotiated with a union and, then, be approved by the workers. They observe that rejection 
of contract menu offers depends on how discriminating the offers are. 
Charness and Kuhn (2007) test predictions from social preference models on whether 
the behavior of two workers in the same firm is affected by the respective co-worker’s 
wage. Contrary to their expectations of a wage compression effect, their results indicate 
                                                 
4 Results based on a survey of managers by Bewley (1999) are an exception. The managers emphasize the 
importance of non-discriminatory contracting on internal harmony and morale, but a survey is only partly 
able to compare situations that differ with regard to discrimination and to assess the effects of discrimination 
on reciprocity and efficiency. 
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that workers’ effort choices are highly sensitive to their own wages, but largely 
unresponsive to co-workers’ wages. Somewhat in contrast to Charness and Kuhn (2007), 
Falk and Ichino (2006) show that co-workers’ efforts matter in a real-effort experiment. 
Gächter et al. (2010), looking at wage and effort information, find that co-workers’ wages 
per se have no effect. When a principal pays different wages to two workers, the co-
worker’s effort decision is ignored. However, worker behavior is affected when both 
pieces of social information are provided: higher wages generate higher effort when one’s 
co-worker exerts high effort, but does not change behavior when the co-worker contributes 
little or no effort. In contrast to the above contributions, we do not focus on the effects of 
social information on the wage-effort relationship. We assess the effects of exogenously 
imposed uniform wages within the firm5 on reciprocity and on important market 
parameters. 
Obviously, it is difficult to judge from real-world observation whether the reluctance 
of employers to offer uniform contracts to homogeneous workers is a consequence of a 
general resentment of principals against “collective” contracts, of some important 
behavioral effects not captured in economic models that could speak against uniform 
contracts across agents, or of possible other reasons. It is a difficult task to compare the 
effects of individualized wages with those of uniform wages within a firm based on field 
data, because disentangling the effects of unionization, measuring the degree of contractual 
incompleteness and assessing the extent of agent heterogeneity is not easy.6 A possible 
alternative route that we pursue in this paper is conducting laboratory experiments. 
Experiments allow focusing on the mere effects of contract standardization in comparison 
to individual contracts. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the details of 
the market model and our experimental design, and Section 3 introduces our theoretical 
                                                 
5 The most widely studied regulations are restrictions on a lower-boundary wage level, with Brandts and 
Charness (2004) finding negative consequences on voluntary effort provision, while Fehr et al. (2006) and 
Owens and Kagel (2010) report that they can have positive effects. Abeler et al. (2010) study a “reverse” 
gift-exchange setting, in which two agents first choose efforts and then the principal sets a wage. In one of 
their treatments principals can only set a single wage for both agents; in the second treatment wages can be 
set individually. If agents provide different levels of effort, equality is obviously unfair, and forcing 
principals to offer a single wage discourages the provision of high efforts, which is what Abeler et al. (2010) 
find. 
6 We are not aware of field evidence on our research question. Again, the literature mainly focuses on the 
effects of social comparison (e.g., Galizzi and Lang, 1998; Neumark and Postlewaite, 1998; Clark et al., 
2008, 2009). There is also an extensive literature on the effects of unionization on labor markets (see, for 
instance, Freeman, 1982, Card et al. 2004; Kahn, 2012), but such approaches cannot disentangle the joint 
effects of unionization and wage standardization. 
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predictions. Section 4 provides the main experimental results, while Section 5 discusses 
why the fair uniform-wage hypothesis is reflected in the data. Section 6 concludes the 
paper and discusses its implications. 
 
 
2 Model and experimental design 
2.1 The principal-agent model with multiple agents in the experiment 
In each session, four subjects were assigned to the role of principals and 16 to the role of 
agents. Each participant received a unique identification (ID) number that remained the 
same throughout the experiment.7 Therefore, participants, though anonymous, were 
identifiable during the whole experiment, and repeated interaction was possible. Each 
period  Tt  ..., ,2 ,1  consisted of two stages: (i) a three-minute trading phase and, (ii) an 
effort-determination phase. Only principals could offer contracts {w, e~ } in the trading 
phase, where w denotes the wage rate and e~  the desired effort level. In the experiment, w 
had to be an integer from the interval [1, 100] and e~  from [1, 10]. 
There was no limit for a principal regarding the number of contract offers within one 
trading period.8 Agents could accept any, but at most one, offer in real time, but could not 
offer contracts to principals themselves. As soon as three contracts of a particular principal 
were accepted, all standing contract offers of this principal were deleted instantaneously. 
The duration of each contract was always one period. Thus, each period started with all the 
agents being unemployed as the default. After the trading phase, those agents who had 
accepted a contract had to submit an effort level e out of the set of feasible effort levels 
{1,2,….,10}. The desired effort level of the principal ( e~ ) was not binding for the agent, 
making the contract incomplete. 
Suppressing the time indices for convenience, in each period the monetary payoffs 
for the agent were determined as follows: 
 

concluded ascontract w no if             5
   concluded ascontract w a if    c(e)-w
A  (1) 
The principal’s monetary payoff was given by: 
                                                 
7 The basic setup follows Brown et al. (2004). We extended their design to allow for multiple agents and our 
treatment variation. 
8 It was permitted to offer the same contract more than once. 
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concluded ascontract w no if                                   0
  concluded ascontract w a if     
11

 



  
N
i
i
N
i
i
P
we  (2) 
where  > 0 is a productivity parameter and N  3 represents the number of 
employed agents. In the experiment, we set  = 10. Agents had to bear a cost of effort 
denoted by c(e) that was increasing in effort with increasing marginal costs according to 
the schedule in Table 1, which is commonly used in the literature. Obviously, the efficient 
effort level was the maximum effort e = 10, as the marginal costs of effort were at most 3, 
and the marginal revenue was always equal to α = 10. If an agent did not conclude a 
contract, he received a lump-sum payment of 5 tokens (the experimental currency unit). 
 
Insert Table 1 around here 
 
An important feature of the trading phase concerns the way contract offers could be 
submitted. Principals could decide whether they wanted to make private or public offers. 
For private offers, a principal had to enter the agent’s ID number with whom she wanted to 
trade. Only this agent was informed about the offer. Public offers were visible to all agents 
as well as to all other principals on the market. Private and public offers could be made 
concurrently during the trading phase. Payoff functions, the cost of effort, the number of 
principals and agents within a session, and the number of periods were common 
knowledge. 
Note that it was easy to establish a long-term relationship by offering contracts 
privately to the agent with the same ID number in subsequent periods. Principals were 
informed about the IDs of agents that were already employed or still unemployed at any 
time during the trading phase. Standing offers, whether private or public, could be accepted 
at any time during the trading phase by unemployed agents. 
 
2.2 Experimental treatments 
We implemented two treatments: In the individual contract treatment (IC), principals 
could offer any contract within the parameter range to any agent privately or over the 
market. There were no other restrictions on contract offers. While in the uniform contract 
treatment (UC) principals could also offer different contracts, they were facing one crucial 
restriction that constitutes the treatment variation: A principal’s first accepted contract 
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became automatically the standard contract for all subsequent contracts within a given 
period in her firm. In other words, the principal was legally bound to offer the same 
contract (as the first one being accepted) to all further (potential) employees in the current 
period. As soon as the first contract of a specific principal was accepted, all standing 
contract offers of this principal that differed from the accepted contract were deleted. 
There are several reasons for implementing the UC treatment in this way. First, we 
did not want to impose any standard contract ourselves because our main interest is in the 
endogenous evolution of wages and effort levels, given that contracts have to be uniform. 
Second, we wanted to avoid a rather complicated collective bargaining procedure between 
principals and agents within a firm that would have rendered the direct comparison 
between the two treatments impossible. While our setup is clearly a simplification of 
reality, and there are other possible ways to implement uniform contracts within a firm, we 
believe that we have chosen a natural starting point with the highest level of experimental 
control. One obvious alternative – letting principals offer only one blueprint contract from 
the start of each trading phase on – was discarded by us because it would have differed too 
profoundly from the IC treatment. Note finally that the payoff functions are completely 
identical for the two treatments, both for principals and agents. 
 
2.3 Laboratory protocol 
Each session consisted of 15 identical periods.9 Upon arrival subjects received detailed 
instructions (given in the Appendix). After an experimenter read them aloud, subjects were 
asked to solve several exercises (also provided in the Appendix) in order to ensure that 
they fully understood the rules and the consequences of every action they were to take in 
the experiment. After having publicly solved the exercises, we answered any remaining 
questions privately before starting the experiment. At the end of each period, subjects were 
informed about contracts, payoffs and ID numbers of the principal and all employed agents 
within their firm. Thus, agents were not only provided with information concerning their 
contracts, but also received information regarding the contracts of their co-agents as well 
                                                 
9 Two practice periods without financial incentives were played in each session before the start of the 
experiment in order to make subjects familiar with the market environment. ID numbers were reshuffled after 
the practice periods to avoid any transfer of reputation effects from the practice phase to the experiment. 
Subjects were fully aware of this procedure. 
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as the total payoff of the principal.10 They were, however, never informed about the 
actually chosen effort levels of their co-workers. Principals received detailed information 
on all contracts within their firm, including all effort levels of their agents. At the end of 
the experiment subjects were asked to fill in a short questionnaire regarding socio-
economic characteristics and were informed about their total earnings converted into euro 
at the pre-announced conversion rate of experimental tokens into euro. The money was 
paid privately and in cash. 
The experiment was implemented using the software z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007). For 
each treatment five sessions were run, with none of the 199 subjects participating in more 
than one of the 10 sessions.11 Participants were students studying different subjects at the 
University of Innsbruck. Sessions lasted about 90 minutes, and participants earned on 
average € 16.57. 
 
 
3 Predictions 
Let us start by assuming that all players are risk-neutral, rational and selfish maximizers of 
monetary profits, and that this is common knowledge. Since the interaction horizon is 
finite and known by all players, we can confine the analysis to one period and apply 
backward induction. Agents would choose the lowest permissible effort level e = 1 because 
effort exertion is costly. As a consequence, principals will offer only the reservation wage 
(w = 5), and the desired effort is obviously irrelevant.12 Twelve trades would take place, 
i.e. each principal should employ the maximum of three agents, and four agents should 
remain unemployed. The resulting subgame-perfect equilibrium is the same for the IC and 
the UC treatment. Thus, according to standard theory we should not observe any difference 
in the market outcomes between the two treatments. 
The theoretical solution based on the assumption of common knowledge of 
rationality and selfishness entails a considerable efficiency loss for our market parameters. 
In equilibrium 5A  and 1553103 P . Within a firm, this amounts to 
303  PA  . Since for the permissible parameter range marginal costs of effort are 
                                                 
10 In contrast to the literature on wage comparison, we wanted to avoid any direct influence und decided to 
inform agents about their co-workers wages only after effort submission. 
11 In one UC session, there were only 15 instead of 16 agents due to low show-ups. 
12 For w = 5 agents are indifferent to accept the offer. Since we require the wage rate to be an integer value, 
w = 6 can also be optimal. From an empirical perspective, the difference is of minor importance. 
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always lower than marginal revenues, the social optimum would be reached at the 
maximum effort level and the maximum number of employed agents. Wages can be 
disregarded as they only constitute a reallocation of the generated rents. Given our 
parameters, 2463  PA   is the Pareto-optimum. Again, there is no difference between 
the two treatments. 
We now consider the case where rationality or selfishness of all players is not 
common knowledge (e.g., Kreps et al., 1982; Fudenberg and Maskin, 1986; Rabin, 1993; 
Levine, 1998; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000; Charness and Rabin, 
2002; Falk and Fischbacher, 2006). Given the plethora of equilibria in the game, we keep 
our theoretical analysis informal because a more formal approach would not add much in 
terms of deriving clear-cut predictions. Depending on the principal’s beliefs over the 
distribution of types (e.g., selfish and non-selfish ones), a principal will either offer trust 
contracts (i.e. contracts with higher than minimal w and )10~ e  or reservation wage 
contracts (i.e. contracts with w = 5 and any e~ ) in the stage game. Hence, in the first 
period, trust contracts (subscript tr) will be offered by a principal when she expects a profit 
larger than 15, i.e. if 15][ , trPE   or, equivalently,     15][ 11    Ni iNi i weE . There is 
no point in concluding different contracts with different agents because there is no way for 
principals to sort agents according to their individual type through the contract offer.13 
While it cannot be part of an equilibrium strategy of principals to conclude different 
contracts with her agents in the first period and, thus, there should not be any difference 
between the IC treatment and the UC treatment, theoretical predictions change for periods 
t > 1, because principals can update their beliefs about agents’ reciprocity levels at the end 
of each period. Rewarding compliant agents (those that provide effort ee ~ ) and 
punishing shirkers (those that provide effort ee ~ ) by not re-employing them or offering 
them less favorable contract terms (a reservation wage contract) in the subsequent period 
can obviously be part of an equilibrium strategy. Such punishment and reward is made 
more difficult to enforce in the UC treatment because principals cannot target individual 
                                                 
13 Note that reputation building can be a profitable strategy in our setup even for completely selfish agents. 
Using the model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Brown et al. (2004) show for the one-on-one principal-agent 
matching that if sufficiently many fair subjects are present, there is an equilibrium in which all agents exert 
high efforts in the first 14 periods, while in period 15 only the fair-minded agents submit non-minimal effort 
levels. This basic rationale also applies to a multiple-agent setting (see Kocher and Strasser, 2012), and 
therefore to our framework. The underlying idea is straightforward: Since the existence of fair agents makes 
it profitable for principals to offer generous contracts, selfish agents have an incentive to disguise their real 
type and mimic the fair agents until the penultimate period. 
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agents properly. In UC, the only punishment threat a principal has is not reemploying 
shirking agents, and any reward has to go to all agents within the firm (also to those that 
have not reciprocated in the previous period or those who have not been employed before). 
We summarize these arguments in the following predictions: 
 
Prediction 1: Principals should employ all their agents under identical contracts 
in the first period. Thus, there should not be any difference between IC and UC 
in the first period. 
 
Prediction 2: If decision-makers are payoff-maximizers and this is common 
knowledge, Prediction 1 extends to the entire interaction horizon. Under more 
general preferences or without the assumption of common knowledge, 
however, heterogeneous contracts within the firm can be part of an equilibrium 
strategy in the IC treatment. Consequently, there might be a difference in 
market outcomes between the two treatments from period 2 on. 
 
Any combination of contracts in UC is also feasible in IC, i.e. principals in IC can 
always copy behavior of principals in UC. In other words, the action space of principals in 
UC is simply a subset of the action space of principals in IC. Hence, principals in IC 
should fare at least as good as principals in UC. However, as soon as one gives up the 
common knowledge assumption, we are facing a multitude of equilibria. Thus, equilibrium 
selection might work differently in the two treatments. Nevertheless, we think it is justified 
to formulate Prediction 3 as a working hypothesis. 
 
Prediction 3: Principals in IC should fare at least as good as principals in UC. 
 
In contrast to predictions 1 to 3 – which suggest no difference between IC and UC – 
the fair uniform-wage hypothesis of Akerlof (1982) leads to an alternative prediction, 
which is our final one: 
 
Prediction 4: Uniform wages lead to significantly higher levels of voluntary 
effort provision and, consequently, higher levels of overall efficiency. 
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4 Main experimental results 
The main descriptive results of the experiment are presented in Table 2 to which we will 
frequently refer to in this section. We display the overall means with standard deviations in 
parentheses. All observations are measured in experimental tokens and percent, 
respectively. When comparing the two treatments, we employ two-sided Mann-Whitney-
U-tests.14 Significance tests have been conducted on the mean values of each experimental 
session (with 20 market participants each). This is the most conservative approach because 
it uses five independent observations per variable for each treatment. 
 
Insert Table 2 around here 
 
 
4.1 Wages and effort levels 
It becomes immediately obvious that several important market variables are significantly 
different across treatments, and that the difference goes in the opposite direction of 
Prediction 3. Wages are by 29.71% higher in the UC treatment than in IC, which is 
statistically significant on conventional levels. Figure 1 shows that mean wages in the UC 
treatment are in all 15 periods well above those of the IC treatment, with the notable 
exception of the very first period (consistent with Prediction 1). In both treatments wages 
display an upward trend over time that appears to be stronger in UC than in IC. While UC-
wages are well above 40 tokens from the fourth period on, reaching their peak of 55.15 in 
period 13, the IC-wages range between 31 and 41. We find the common endgame-effect, 
but wages stay above 40 and 30 tokens, respectively.15 
 
Insert Figure 1 and Figure 2 around here 
 
Average effort levels in Figure 2 are also higher in markets with uniform contracts 
than in markets with individual contracts. The average effort difference of 29.08% between 
the two treatments matches the 29.71% average wage difference almost perfectly. Again, 
                                                 
14 Applying two-sided t-tests produced qualitatively the same results. 
15 There is no significant difference between the first contract offered by a principal and the first accepted 
contract. Hence our findings carry over from realized contracts to offered contracts. 
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the treatment difference is significant; we also observe an upward trend and a rather strong 
endgame effect. In sum, the results for wages and efforts support Prediction 4. 
 
4.2 Market efficiency and the share of private and public offers 
Market efficiency is obviously one of the most important variables in our analysis, because 
it concerns the heart of the fair uniform-wage hypothesis. With higher wages and efforts in 
UC, and unemployment rates almost equal to those in IC, it is clear that the overall market 
efficiency is significantly higher in UC than in IC. The first row of Table 2 displays 
aggregate mean payoffs per period generated within a market, i.e. token earnings of all 20 
players. In UC, these payoffs are on average 124.96 tokens or 23.68% higher than in IC. 
While in IC only 52% of the maximal efficiency is achieved, it is 65% in UC. Figure 3 
shows average profits per subject in each single period, and they are always higher in UC 
than in IC. Actually, both principals and agents earn more in UC than in IC, but the 
difference is only significant for agents, because the variance of payoffs is much larger 
among principals than among agents. 
 
Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here 
 
Another significant difference between the two treatments concerns the share of 
private offers. The number of private offers is weakly significantly higher in UC than in IC 
(see Table 2). Figure 4 shows the time trend of private offers. Targeting specific agents in 
order to induce higher levels of effort seems to be one of the differences that the institution 
of uniform contracts causes. However, overall tenure at the same firm is not significantly 
longer in UC (see Table 2), although higher on average in all but two periods. Yet, we find 
a significant treatment difference in the likelihood with which all three workers in period t 
are re-employed through private offers from the same principal also in period t+1. This 
happens in 41% of cases in UC, but only in 22% of cases in IC (p < 0.01; χ²-test). 
 
4.3 Reciprocity 
Figure 5 provides an overview of the level of reciprocity. The following parametric 
regression analysis basically reproduces the general pattern conveyed by the figure and our 
findings based on non-parametric statistics, but it also offers new insights. In Table 3 we 
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report a Tobit estimation with the effort level as the dependent variable.16 We take into 
account the censoring of effort levels at e = 1 and e = 10 and use session fixed effects. 
 
Insert Table 3 and Figure 5 around here 
 
The first model (model 1) accounts for the following independent variables: wage, 
period and period squared, a dummy for private offers, and a dummy for the UC treatment. 
As expected, wages and the use of private contracts have a significantly positive impact on 
efforts chosen. The variables period and period squared account for a supposedly non-
linear time trend in all estimated models. Indeed, the time trend describes an inverted U-
shape, with efforts rising in earlier periods and declining later on. 
If we include the tenure of the relationship (model 2) between a principal and an 
agent as an independent variable, the significance levels of all other variables remain 
unchanged, and the magnitude of the effects remains similar, suggesting that a potential 
endogeneity bias is at best small. The variable itself is, as expected, highly significant. 
The UC-dummy in models 1 and 2 shows the treatment differences in overall effort 
levels. It fails significance in model 1, and is even significantly negative in model 2, when 
taking tenure into account. Next, we estimate the sensitivity of efforts on wages for the two 
treatments separately. To this end, we introduce an interaction dummy variable called 
UC*wage in models 3 and 4 that captures the slope of the wage-effort function. These 
models show that the introduction of this interaction variable renders the pure treatment 
dummy, controlling for the wage level, significantly negative, although the results for all 
other variables remain almost unchanged. The coefficient for the interaction dummy itself 
is not significant.17 
Our findings regarding important market characteristics are qualitatively and often 
even quantitatively in line with the results of Brown et al. (2004).18 Although they analyze 
a one-on-one gift exchange market and they only have seven principals and ten agents on a 
                                                 
16 Using a Poisson-regression leads to the same insights. Results are available upon request. 
17 Including desired efforts as an independent variable does not change our conclusions, either. Since its 
behavioral effect on actually chosen efforts is, however, quite strong, it slightly affects the magnitude of the 
coefficients for the wage level (results are available upon request). Co-agents’ wages and wage differentials 
within a firm cannot (and actually do not) have an impact because agents receive information on them only 
after they have decided on effort levels. 
18 We were able to compare all market variables, even those not reported in Brown et al. (2004), because the 
authors provided us with their raw data, for which we are very grateful. 
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market, which makes it impossible to compare the two experiments directly, it is a re-
assuring fact that the results from different setups exhibit very similar characteristics.19 
 
4.4 Do principals in the IC treatment offer identical contracts? 
Here we analyze whether principals in the IC treatment voluntarily offer identical contracts 
to their agents in the first period, as we hypothesized based on both standard and more 
general preferences (see Prediction 1). We find that only 20% of all principals in the IC 
treatment offer homogeneous contracts to their employees in the first period, in which 
there cannot be any sanctioning motive in the contract offer. Across all 15 periods, only in 
13% of cases principals offer identical contracts. This refutes Prediction 1 and the part of 
Prediction 2 that was based on standard payoff-maximizing preferences with the common 
knowledge assumption.  
While we refute the hypothesis of principals offering uniform wages voluntarily, the 
underlying intuition – namely that principals should offer identical contracts to their agents 
in any given period – might still have been correct. In order to investigate that, we analyze 
whether those principals who offer identical contracts in IC are more successful than their 
peers in the IC treatment and, thus, statistically indistinguishable from principals in the UC 
treatment. Indeed, we find that outcome parameters of principals that voluntarily offer 
identical contracts to their agents in IC are not significantly different from outcome 
parameters for principals in UC. With an average wage of 44.45 tokens and an average 
actual effort level of 5.82 tokens (over all periods), these firms in the IC treatment exhibit 
only insignificantly lower numbers than in UC (where corresponding numbers are 47.15, 
respectively 6.57; p > 0.4 in the comparisons for both variables), while firms in the IC 
treatment that do not offer identical contracts have significantly lower average wages 
(32.60) and efforts (4.65) than in UC (p < 0.05 in both cases). Consequently, IC-firms that 
offer identical contracts achieve a similar level of earnings as firms in UC. In other words, 
the market in the IC treatment would have fared better with a higher level of within-firm 
uniformity of contracts, which has been exogenously imposed in the UC treatment. Hence, 
forcing firms to offer uniform contracts can be beneficial in certain situations. It is 
                                                 
19 It is not surprising, however, that the quantitative level of reciprocity tends to be a bit lower in our 
experiment. This is due to the fact that each principal can employ up to three agents and, thus, can earn three 
times the amount of principals in the usual one-on-one setting. As a consequence, the level of reciprocity of 
individual agents tends to be lower but the reduction is much smaller than necessary if it was to equalize 
payoffs for principals and agents (see also Maximiano et al., 2007). 
 15
noteworthy that our result for the IC treatment is not a consequence of social comparison 
within a given period. Remember that we did only provide details on contracts of co-agents 
within the same firm after everybody had exerted effort. Rather, it seems that it is an effect 
based on a joint underlying characteristic of some principals: Principals who are more 
likely to offer the same wages to their workers voluntarily are also more likely to offer 
higher wages and therefore earn more than other principals. The joint underlying 
characteristic that drives both action tendencies could be inequity aversion, but it could 
also be strategic intelligence. 
 
 
5 Discussing the determinants of the fair uniform-wage 
hypothesis 
We have found that uniform wages – regardless of whether they are chosen voluntarily (in 
the IC treatment) or whether they are exogenously imposed (in the UC treatment) – lead to 
significantly higher levels of voluntary effort provision and, consequently, to significantly 
higher levels of overall efficiency. This supports the fair uniform-wage hypothesis. 
However, it is important to emphasize that this main result is not driven by workers being 
more reciprocal as such for a given wage level (see Table 3 for convincing evidence). 
Rather, the average wage level is significantly higher with uniform wages than with 
differentiated wages. 
The efficiency premium of uniform wages over differentiated wages builds up over 
time, and it is persistent over time, once it has built up. It does not exist in the first period, 
but starts to become significant from the second period on. Table 4 gives a detailed 
impression of the emergence of the difference between the IC treatment and the UC 
treatment by comparing averages of relevant variables in the first period and in the second 
period of each treatment.20 While there is no difference between the treatments in the first 
period, the following variables become significantly different already in the second period: 
market volume, i.e. the sum of all rents, wages, efforts, desired efforts and the profits of 
agents. 
 
Insert Table 4 around here 
                                                 
20 Because both, two sided t-tests and Mann-Whitney-U-tests produced qualitatively the same results, we 
report only the former. 
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Obviously, the negative overall effect of differentiated wages in IC has to do with 
wage setting in connection with reputation in period 2 and later. In the IC treatment, 
principals can (implicitly) reward single agents by offering them an at least as favorable 
contract in period t+1 as in period t if they complied with the desired effort level and 
principals can punish shirkers by decreasing the wage in the contract offer in period t+1 or 
by not re-employing them at all. Through the channel of private offers it is always possible 
to avoid hiring a shirker in period t+1. Public offers are much less profitable for agents 
than private offers21, because principals take into account that shirkers are more likely to 
accept public offers (they hardly receive any of the more profitable private offers). Hence, 
it is easy to reward reciprocal behavior through the use of private offers and to insure 
oneself as a principal against exploitation by not offering trust contracts publicly over the 
market in the IC treatment. 
In the UC treatment, principals also have the opportunity not to re-employ shirking 
agents, but if they want to reward their compliant agents they have to make equally 
profitable contract offers in period t+1 to random other agents through private or public 
offers (facing the risk of re-employing or employing a shirker), because the threat of 
keeping the post vacant is not credible, given the forgone surplus. As a consequence, 
contract offers have to be much bolder in UC than in IC, leading to a significantly higher 
overall efficiency in UC. However, a priori it was completely unclear whether principals 
in the UC treatment would rather prefer to keep posts vacant or whether they would prefer 
to take the “risk” of making generous offers to new agents. It would have been conceivable 
that principals do not employ the maximum of three agents in the UC treatment and that, 
therefore, market efficiency goes down as a consequence of higher unemployment. Our 
results show, however, exactly the opposite. 
Table 5 provides more evidence on the implicit asymmetry in reward and 
punishment between IC and UC. It shows that with private offers, the UC treatment starts 
out with even lower levels of wages than the IC treatment, although the difference is not 
significant on the session level with five independent observations.22 The important change 
occurs in the second period. While the average wage in accepted private offers stays 
practically the same in the IC treatment, we see a surge of wages in accepted private offers 
                                                 
21 In IC the average wage in a public offer is 19.12, but it is 40.91 in private offers (p < 0.01). In UC, the 
corresponding figures are 31.44, respectively 48.88 (p < 0.01). 
22 Again, a two sided t-test and a Mann-Whitney-U-test produced qualitatively the same results. 
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from 39 to 52 in the UC treatment. Consistently, this is the region of wage offers that 
turned out to be profit maximizing for principals ex post. For the public offers on the 
market, a similar effect is observed. Here the level of wages in the UC treatment is already 
slightly higher than in the IC treatment in the first period, but not significantly so. While 
the average wage in accepted public offers falls in the IC treatment from period 1 to period 
2, indicating that principals get more reluctant to offer trust contracts to unknown agents, it 
increases substantially for the UC treatment, so that the difference between the two 
treatments in the second period becomes significant. Consequently, we observe a smaller 
difference between wages in accepted private offers and public offers in period 2 in the UC 
treatment (18.06 tokens) than in the IC treatment (23.53 tokens).23 
 
Insert Table 5 around here 
 
As a next step it is interesting to look how principals react to agents who show 
different degrees of reciprocity. For the sake of succinctness, we confine ourselves again to 
the transition from period 1 to period 2. We compare the development of wages from 
period 1 (w(t-1)) to period 2 (w(t)) for three types of agents: (i) the one with the lowest 
effort level within the firm (min), (ii) the one with the medium effort level (med), and (iii) 
the one with the highest effort level (max) in period t-1. In the IC treatment we see a very 
strong differentiation in wages contingent on efforts in the previous period. Whereas the 
average wage of those agents who provided the highest effort within their firm in period 1 
increases from 35.67 tokens in period 1 to 59.17 tokens in period 2, the wages of the 
agents with the median and the minimum effort level within the firm in period 1 rise only 
by 1.40 and 0.15 tokens, respectively. In the UC treatment, where principals can only 
decide not to re-employ a specific agent but have to offer the same contract to new agents 
as to reciprocal ones, we do not observe such a differentiation. The wage difference 
between the first and the second period contingent on effort levels in the first period is very 
similar and does not depend systematically on whether one has provided the highest effort 
within the firm in period 1 (w(t) – w(t-1) = 8.47), the median effort (w(t) – w(t-1) = 10.44) 
or the minimum effort (w(t) – w(t-1) = 6.41). 
                                                 
23 Our conclusions are confirmed when we use individual data instead of session averages. Note also that 
there is not much difference between actually accepted average wages and the average of all offered wages 
both publicly and privately (see bottom of Table 4). The same holds true for the first offer on the market in a 
specific period and the first accepted contract offer in that period. Hence, our conclusions go also through for 
posted offers and not only for accepted offers. 
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Table 6 disentangles the result for agents that are employed by the same principal in 
the two periods and agents who are employed by different principals. Although the number 
of observations becomes rather small for certain categories, the overall picture is quite 
clear. Obviously, there is not much difference between the two treatments for re-employed 
agents, but there is a very stark difference similar to the one described above for the 
aggregated data for agents who are employed by another principal in period 2. 
 
Insert Table 6 around here 
 
Recall that uniform wages within a firm are rare in the IC treatment. Compared to the 
behavioral social optimum, principals seem to over-differentiate wages or they seem to 
overuse the implicit sanctioning mechanisms (see also, for instance, Nikiforakis, 2008; 
Abbink et al., 2010), or they trust newly employed agents too little (see also, Bolton et al., 
2004). However, their behavior is not necessarily irrational. Table 2 shows that principals 
earn more, on average, in UC (and at a lower standard deviation of income) than in IC, but 
not significantly so. In contrast to principals, agents clearly gain from uniform contracts. 
More precisely, most of the efficiency premium accrues to agents, which is not surprising, 
given their implicit bargaining power in a situation in which only a minimal effort level is 
contractible. 
The main question of this section has been whether implementing a mandatory 
uniform wage within a firm for identical agents can be efficiency-enhancing? We can 
conclude with an affirmative answer now: Although such an institution impedes the 
principals’ sanctioning toolbox, it leads to a clear increase in market efficiency. Hence, the 
results in this paper can be viewed as evidence that contractual limitations in markets with 
incomplete contracts can be beneficial. 
 
 
6 Conclusion 
This paper has been motivated by testing a forgotten part of Akerlof’s (1982) seminal gift 
exchange hypothesis. What we have called the fair uniform-wage hypothesis is based on 
the second, often neglected aspect of gift exchange proposed by Akerlof (1982), and it is 
the sister of the well-known fair wage-effort hypothesis. The uniform-wage hypothesis 
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stipulates that identical agents that are employed for the same wage level will exert more 
effort, resulting in more rent extraction, than agents that receive different wages. 
Our results based on two experimental treatments – an individualized contracts 
treatment with no contractual limitations and a uniform contracts treatment with 
exogenously imposed uniformity of contracts within a firm – indicate that principals rarely 
offer identical contracts to a priori identical agents if they are allowed to differentiate 
individually, and that the number of uniform contracts within firms does not increase when 
principals get more experienced. The introduction of our (rather weak) institution of 
uniform (standardized) contracts within firms has a significant and economically relevant 
effect on market parameters. It increases average wages, average effort levels and, 
therefore, market efficiency and earnings considerably. 
Hence, we empirically corroborate the importance of the fair uniform-wage 
hypothesis for efficiency levels on labor markets. Akerlof’s (1982) theory was based on 
the insight that the bilateral gift exchange between a principal and an agent needs to be 
complemented by a social comparison among agents in a setting with multiple agents. We 
have shown that the total efficiency rent from gift exchange is, in fact, the result of a 
combination of the individual fair wage-effort relationship – which lets efforts respond 
positively to wages – and the fair uniform-wage relationship – which increases wages, and 
as a consequence efforts and market efficiency. Agents do not become more reciprocal 
with uniform contracts for a given wage level, however. The efficiency-enhancing effect is 
the consequence of eliminating a tendency of principals to over-differentiate contracts 
within their firm and to overuse implicit sanctioning of shirkers – if they are allowed to – 
compared to the empirically optimal level. Note that there is also a higher re-employment 
rate in the uniform contracts treatment than in the individualized contracts treatment. In 
other words, the institution of exogenously implemented uniform contracts within a firm 
makes principals more forgiving, which in turn is beneficial for the achieved level of 
efficiency. It might “teach” agents the virtue of reciprocity in situations with incomplete 
contracts more quickly, and it reduces the impact of unemployment as a disciplining 
device (Brown et al., 2012), with positive effects on the market. 
Implementing the institution of non-discrimination based on history becomes 
socially optimal, even if such an institution does not seem to be essential for the 
functioning of incomplete contract markets in the first place. Principals in our experiment 
obviously use the instrument of differentiation too frequently (in the individual contracts 
 20
treatment). How does this result relate to labor markets in the field? Real-world 
applications for our findings have to exhibit two important features: (i) repeated interaction 
with reputation building, and (ii) incomplete contracts. Several industries, especially in the 
service sector, fulfill these characteristics to a large extent. For instance, in the tourism 
industry, workers are often employed only for one season and, depending on their 
performance, re-employed in the subsequent season. Although some features of their work 
can be contracted upon, there are, without doubt, important characteristics like friendliness 
to customers that are very difficult to write down in an enforceable contract.24 
Are there other behavioral regularities that are able to explain the behavioral pattern 
that we observe in our experiment? If one assumes that agents are averse against being the 
sucker in their group, they might feel more secure in the uniform contract treatment 
because they know that everybody in their potential reference group receives the same 
wage, and therefore provide higher levels of effort. The effect we observe is, however, not 
driven by more reciprocal agents but by higher wages offered through principals. 
Furthermore, the let-down aversion explanation would imply a treatment effect right from 
the first period on, or at least a conversion of the outcomes in our two treatments over time. 
The latter would also be expected for any kind of non-equilibrium or learning theories as 
well as from different forms of inequity aversion models. If principals experiment in the 
beginning or simply make mistakes in their offers, we would anticipate a fading treatment 
effect over time, but the effect is persistent over time. 
In general, the discussion on the use of (implicit) sanctions and their efficiency 
implications is far from conclusive. (Implicit) reward seems to work better in our labor 
market case than (implicit) punishment. In other words, more restricted sanctioning (in the 
uniform contract treatment) seems to work better from an efficiency perspective than less 
restricted sanctioning (in the individualized contract treatment). Whether this is a 
consequence of our setup or a more general conclusion, is worthwhile investigating in the 
future because existing evidence, mostly from social dilemmas, does not allow for a clear 
conclusion.25 In any case, we are – as far as we know – the first to address the issue of 
                                                 
24 If one drops the labor market analogy and looks at product or service markets with non-enforceable 
quality, further applications become apparent, such as, for instance, whether it is beneficial to have a uniform 
price for medical services or whether non-uniform (individual) prices may ultimately lead to the provision of 
higher quality in the medical system. 
25 Our results provide another piece of evidence for the over-use of (implicit) sanctioning mechanisms (see, 
for instance, Herrmann et al., 2008). On the effects of restricted sanctioning in a public goods game, see 
Kroll et al. (2007). 
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overuse of implicit sanctions and its adverse effects on efficiency in a labor market 
context. Another avenue for further research is to consider a bargaining process between 
principals and agents when setting wages, and whether bargaining will have an effect on 
how uniform wages affect wages, efforts, and market efficiency. 
In sum, our results show that limiting contractual freedom can have positive effects 
on market efficiency and thus on welfare. With a growing number of workers within a firm 
working alongside each other with different contractual specifications (e.g., temporary 
workers and workers with a permanent contract), this is an essential insight for real-world 
labor markets. There is a social component to gift exchange (as hypothesized by Akerlof, 
1982) in the sense that differentiation among agents in the same firm leads to an inferior 
result than equal treatment. However, the effect cannot be only a consequence of social 
comparison among agents; if it were, the treatment effect should become smaller over 
time, because agents learn also in the individualized treatment whether they have been 
treated equally by the principal or not at the end of each period. Our results imply that the 
virtue of an equal wage requirement within a firm is that it restricts the (over-)use of 
differentiation in wage and/or implicit sanctions based on the history of conduct of agents 
by principals. The requirement does not increase unemployment, generated by principals 
that keep posts deliberately vacant. Because unemployment levels stay the same, a uniform 
wage requirement is an effective tool in increasing overall market efficiency on labor 
markets. 
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Figure 1. Average wages 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Average efforts 
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Figure 3. Average payoffs (period means) 
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Table 2. Overview of descriptive results 
Variables IC UC 
p (Mann- 
Whitney-U; two-
sided) 
Market Volume* 527.65 (128.81) 652.61 (94.32) 0.076 
Share Principal 0.27 (0.07) 0.28 (0.06) 0.465 
Wage 36.35 (8.17) 47.15 (4.25) 0.047 
Effort 5.09 (1.50) 6.57 (0.80) 0.047 
Desired Effort 7.01 (0.95) 7.91 (1.07) 0.117 
Number of Contracts 11.68 (0.23) 11.57 (0.49) 0.754 
Number of Offers 14.64 (2.05) 13.47 (1.18) 0.602 
Share of Private Offers 0.66 (0.16) 0.83 (0.16) 0.076 
Profit Principal per Contract 14.58 (6.91) 18.54 (5.36) 0.347 
Profit Principal 42.59 (20.50) 53.96 (16.52) 0.465 
Profit Agent 29.13 (5.06) 37.06 (3.36) 0.028 
Average Tenure 2.09 (1.48) 2.68 (0.77) 0.602 
Note: We display the overall means with standard deviations in parentheses. All observations are measured in 
experimental tokens and percent, respectively. Significance tests have been conducted using the mean values of 
each experimental session, thereby using five independent observations per treatment on each variable. Bold 
numbers indicate a (partly, weakly) significant difference between the two treatments. 
*Market volume is calculated as the sum of all earnings on the market in one period. 
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Table 3. Tobit estimations 
Dependent Variable: Effort (censored at 1 and 10) 
 Model 1 2 3 4 
Constant -1.200*** -0.889*** 1.444*** -1.082*** 
  (3.84) (2.83) (4.00) (2.98) 
Wage 0.162*** 0.154*** 0.167*** 0.158*** 
 (35.29) (32.62) (27.77) (25.64) 
Period 0.210*** 0.187*** 0.220*** 0.195*** 
 (4.04) (3.62) (4.20) (3.75) 
Period² -0.022*** -0.025*** -0.023*** -0.025*** 
 (6.42) (7.04) (6.54) (7.11) 
Tenure - 0.165*** - 0.163*** 
  (5.50)  (5.44) 
Private 1.654*** 1.514*** 1.621*** 1.490*** 
  (8.50) (7.78) (8.28) (7.61) 
UC Dummy 0.142 -0.973*** -0.945* -0.982** 
 (0.44) (3.03) (1.87) (1.96) 
UC*Wage Dummy - - -0.011 -0.009 
   (1.37) (1.07) 
Observations 1952 1952 1952 1952 
Log likelihood -3463.45 -3462.88 -3478.6 -3477.66 
Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses.
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table 4. Mean values in periods 1 and 2 (and difference tests) 
Period means 
IC UC Two-
sided t-
test p 
Per1 
IC UC Two-sided 
t-test p 
Per2 Per 1 Per 1 Per 2 Per 2 
Market Volume 444.400 510.600 0.401 455.200 577.400 0.015 
Share Principal 0.265 0.340 0.245 0.340 0.329 0.863 
Wage 33.900 34.582 0.877 32.838 42.614 0.011 
Effort 4.465 4.977 0.506 4.730 5.938 0.044 
Desired Effort 6.767 6.759 0.991 6.612 7.686 0.022 
Number of Contracts 11.400 11.800 0.397 11.200 11.400 0.667 
Number of Offers 15.000 14.200 0.509 15.400 13.000 0.082 
Share of Private Offers 47.49% 60.52% 0.130 50.61% 60.56% 0.527 
       
Profit Principal 
per Contract 10.745 15.191 0.284 14.459 16.765 0.564 
       
Profit Principal 122.000 181.200 0.232 158.200 191.800 0.431 
Profit Agent 28.310 27.759 0.857 26.600 33.823 0.017 
Average Tenure 0.000 0.000 no test 0.388 0.355 0.805 
Offered wages 34.460 31.183 0.646 31.248 42.583 0.019 
Publicly offered wages 25.193 29.557 0.420 22.952 34.054 0.020 
Privately offered wages 43.218 35.140 0.298 38.825 50.945 0.137 
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Table 5. Accepted private and public wage offers 
Treatment Mean St. Dv. Obs. 
Pr
iv
at
e 
O
ffe
rs
 
IC 
Period 1 48.793 3.72 5 
Period 2 47.190 2.57 5 
Total 44.242 3.94 5 
UC 
Period 1 39.360 6.25 5 
Period 2 52.114 5.19 5 
Total 50.089 1.48 5 
t-test p: 
(two sided) 
IC vs. UC: Per 1 0.2310 
IC vs. UC: Per 2 0.4193 
IC vs. UC: Total 0.2022 
      
Treatment Mean St. Dv. Obs. 
Pu
bl
ic
 O
ffe
rs
. IC 
Period 1 25.526 3.55 5 
Period 2 23.656 1.53 5 
Total 19.038 4.69 5 
UC. 
Period 1 29.557 4.89 5 
Period 2 34.054 3.64 4 
Total 31.914 4.41 5 
t-test p: 
(two sided) 
IC vs. UC: Per 1 0.5232 
IC vs. UC: Per 2 0.0245 
IC vs. UC: Total 0.0299 
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Table 6. Wage changes from period 1 to period 2 
 
A) All employments in period 2 
  Effort Rank in Period 1 
IC 
  min med max 
N 15 6 15 
w(t-1) 27.60 32.00 37.73 
w(t) 27.27 32.50 49.00 
w(t) - w(t-1) -0.33 0.50 11.27 
UC 
N 17 9 17 
w(t-1) 35.18 34.78 35.18 
w(t) 41.59 45.22 43.65 
w(t) - w(t-1) 6.41 10.44 8.47 
B) Same employer in period 2 
  Effort Rank in Period 1 
IC 
  min med max 
N 7 3 9 
w(t-1) 30.57 33.33 47.11 
w(t) 33.43 31.67 52.78 
w(t) - w(t-1) 2.86 -1.67 5.67 
UC 
N 7 6 9 
w(t-1) 46.14 43 44.78 
w(t) 48.86 45.33 51.33 
w(t) - w(t-1) 2.71 2.33 6.56 
     
C) Different employers in periods 1 and 2 
  Effort Rank in Period 1 
IC 
  min med max 
N 8 3 6 
w(t-1) 25.00 30.67 23.67 
w(t) 21.88 33.33 43.33 
w(t) - w(t-1) -3.13 2.67 19.67 
UC 
 min med max 
N 10 3 8 
w(t-1) 27.50 18.33 24.38 
w(t) 36.50 45.00 35.00 
w(t) - w(t-1) 9.00 26.67 10.63 
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Appendix A: Instructions for the UC treatment (Originally in German; 
not for publication – will be provided on the authors’ website) 
 
The aim of this experiment is to investigate economic decision making. During the experiment you and the 
other participants will be asked to make decisions. You will earn money in doing so. The amount of your 
payoff is determined by your own decision as well as by those made by the other participants according to 
the rules on the following pages. 
 
2 types of participants 
There are two types of participant: type A and type B. You will be randomly assigned to one of these roles. 
Your role (A or B) is displayed on the upper range of your screen throughout the experiment. Your role will 
stay the same (A or B) throughout the whole experiment. 
 
Earnings 
At the beginning of the experiment you will receive an initial endowment of 3 Euro. During the course of the 
experiment you can earn a further amount of money by gaining points. All points that you gain during the 
course of the experiment will be exchanged into Euro at the end of the experiment. The exchange rate will 
be:  
1 point = 0.03 Euro (3 Eurocent); 
therefore 1 Euro = 33.33 points 
At the end of the experiment you will be paid the money that you earned during the experiment in addition to 
your endowment of 3 Euro, privately and in cash. 
 
Duration 
The experiment will take approx. 150 minutes. It is divided into 15 periods. In each period you have to make 
decisions, which you will enter on a computer screen. 
 
Documentation 
The last page of these instructions contains a documentation sheet. At the beginning of the experiment you 
have to fill in your identification number (displayed on the screen). In each round you will fill in certain 
information (see below) into the corresponding rows. Please hand this sheet in at the end of the experiment.  
 
Anonymity 
The identities of the participants you interacted with will not be revealed to you at any point in time. Neither 
during nor after the experiment will any of the other participants be informed about your role, or how much 
you have earned. 
 
 
Please note that communication between participants is strictly prohibited during the experiment. In addition 
we would like to point out that you may only use the computer functions which are required for the 
experiment. Communication between participants and unnecessary tinkering with the computer will lead to 
immediate exclusion from the experiment.  
 
An Overview of the Experimental Procedures 
In each period of the experiment every Type A participant can conclude trades with three participants of type 
B. Type B earns a profit if he receives a transfer which exceeds his costs. Type A earns a profit if the transfer 
he sends is less than what the factor is worth to him. The costs that type B has to bear and the earnings of 
type A are determined by the factor chosen by type B. 
 
The experiment lasts for 15 periods. In each period the procedures are as follows: 
 
1. Each period starts with a trading phase which lasts 3 minutes. During this phase participants of type A 
can submit offers which can be accepted by participants of type B. A buyer has to specify three 
components when submitting an offer: 
 which transfer he offers to send, 
 which factor he desires, 
 , which type B he wants to submit the offer to.  
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Type A participants can submit two types of offers; private offers and public offers. Private offers are 
submitted to one type B only and can only be accepted by that particular participant. Public offers are 
submitted to all type B participants and can be accepted by any type B. 
 
Type A participants can - in each period - submit as many offers as they like. Submitted offers can be 
accepted at any time during the trading phase. Each type B participant can at most conclude one trade in 
each period. Each type A participant can at most conclude three trades per period. As there are 16 type 
B and 4 type A participants, several type Bs will not trade in each period. 
 
 
2. Following the trading phase each type B who has concluded a trade determines which factor he will 
send. Type B is not obliged to send the factor desired by the type A. Once every participant of type B has 
chosen a factor each participant's earnings in the current period are determined. After this the next period 
starts.  
 
The points gained during all 15 periods will be summed up at the end of the experiment, exchanged into 
EURO and paid together with your endowment in cash. 
 
 
As a reference to the real world, one can think of the experiment as a labor market: Type A is the employer 
offering job contracts, containing the wage (transfer) and the desired effort i.e., working hours etc. (factor). 
Each employer can hire 3 employees (see figure 1). After being employed (having accepted the offer) the 
workers decide whether to accomplish the desired effort or not.  
 
The Experimental Procedure in Detail 
There are 4 type A and 16 type B participants in the experiment. Your role will stay the same (A or B) 
throughout the whole experiment. Next, we provide a detailed description about your decision in each 
period. 
 
 
The trading phase 
 
TYPE A 
 
Each period starts with a trading phase. During the trading phase each Type A can conclude a trade with up 
to three type B participants. In order to do so each type A can submit as many offers as he wishes. 
In each trading phase participants of Type A see the following screen: 
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Income type A= 10*(factor1 + factor2 + factor3) – (transfer1 + transfer2 + transfer3) 
 
Type A receives the sum of all transfers (at most three) which are multiplied by the factor 10. He has to pay 
the sum of all transfers. 
 
As can be seen see from the above formula the income of type A is higher, the higher the factor chosen by 
the participants of type B. At the same time the income is higher, the lower the transfer(s). 
 
Income Type B: 
 If no trade was concluded, participants of type B receive an income of 5 points in that period. 
 If type B accepted an offer, the income depends on the transfer sent and on the costs of the factor chosen 
by type B. The income is calculated as follows:  
 
Income type B = transfer – costs of the factor 
 
The higher the chosen factor, the higher the costs. The costs for each possible factor are displayed in the table 
below: 
 
factor 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
costs of the factor 0 1 2 4 6 8 10 12 15 18 
 
The income of type B is therefore higher, the lower the factor chosen and the higher the transfer(s) received. 
 
The income of all Type A and type B participants are determined in the same way. Each participant can 
therefore calculate his own income and the income of the players connected with him in that period. 
Furthermore, each participant is informed about the identification number of his trading partner in each 
period. 
 
Please note that you can incur losses in each period. These losses have to be paid from the initial endowment 
or from earnings made in other periods. 
 
Information 
You will be informed about your income and the income of the participants connected to you on an "income 
screen". On this screen (see below) the following will be displayed: 
 The ID(s) of the participants you concluded a trade with, 
 the offered transfer, 
 the desired factor, 
 the actual factor chosen, 
 the income of each participant involved, and 
 your income in this period. 
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Control Questionnaire 
Please solve the following exercises completely. If you have questions ask the experimenter. Wrong answers 
will not have any effect on the experiment or your payoffs.  
 
Exercise 1 
Type A did not make an offer during the trading phase. What is his income in this period? 
Income type A = 
 
Exercise 2 
Type B did not accept an offer during the trading phase. What is his income in this period? 
Income type B = 
 
Exercise 3: 
An offer containing a transfer 30 and a desired factor of 9 is accepted. Type B chooses a factor of 9.  
     Income type A= 
     Income type B =  
 
Exercise 4: 
An offer containing a transfer 60 and a desired factor of 9 is accepted. Type B chooses a factor of 6.  
     Income type A=  
     Income type B =  
 
Exercise 5: 
An offer containing a transfer 10 a desired factor of 2 is accepted. Type B chooses a factor of 5 
     Income type A=  
     Income type B =  
 
Exercise 6: 
An offer containing a transfer 40 and a desired factor of 4 is accepted. Type B chooses a factor of 5. 
     Income type A=  
     Income type B =  
 
Exercise 7: 
During the trading phase Type A made several offers. None of theses offers was accepted. What is his income 
in this period? 
Income type A=  
 
Exercise 8: 
The following offers were accepted: 
Trade 1: Transfer 40 desired factor 7; chosen factor 5. 
Trade 2: Transfer40 desired factor 7; chosen factor 8. 
Trade 3: Transfer 40 desired factor 7; chosen factor 4. 
     Income type B(Trade1) =  
     Income type B(Trade2) =  
     Income type B(Trade3) =  
     Income type A =  
 
When you have completed the exercises we recommend taking a second look at the exercises and the 
solutions provided. 
